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FAST ALGORITHMS FOR RANK-1 BIMATRIX GAMES
BHARAT ADSULa, JUGAL GARGb, RUTA MEHTAb, MILIND SOHONIa AND
BERNHARD VON STENGELc
The rank of a bimatrix game is the matrix rank of the sum of the two payoff
matrices. For a game of rank r, the set of its Nash equilibria is the intersection
of a generically one-dimensional set of equilibria of parameterized games of
rank r− 1 with a hyperplane. We comprehensively analyze games of rank one.
They are economically more interesting than zero-sum games (which have
rank zero), but are nearly as easy to solve. One equilibrium of a rank-1 game
can be found in polynomial time. All equilibria of a rank-1 game can be found
by path-following, which finds only one equilibrium of a bimatrix game. The
number of equilibria of a rank-1 game may be exponential. We also present
a new rank-preserving homeomorphism between bimatrix games and their
equilibrium correspondence.
KEYWORDS: bimatrix game, Nash equilibrium, rank-1 game, polynomial-
time algorithm, homeomorphism.
1. INTRODUCTION
Non-cooperative games are basic economic models, with Nash equilibrium as
the central solution concept. In order to be a useful solution, a Nash equilib-
rium must be found by some method (including any adjustment process). For
larger games this requires computer algorithms. We consider bimatrix games
(two-player games in strategic form), for which one equilibrium is found by the
algorithm by Lemke and Howson (1964). Finding all equilibria is feasible only
for a few dozen strategies per player due to the exponential number of possible
mixed equilibrium strategies (Avis, Rosenberg, Savani, and von Stengel, 2010).
This paper is an in-depth study of rank-1 games, introduced in Kannan and
Theobald (2010), where the sum of the two payoff matrices has matrix rank one.
They generalize zero-sum games where that matrix rank is zero. Rank-1 games
are economically more interesting than zero-sum games, by allowing a “multi-
plicative” interaction in addition to an arbitrary zero-sum component (discussed
further in Section 9). Like general bimatrix games, they can have many disjoint
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equilibria. On the other hand, as we show, they are computationally tractable: One
equilibrium of a rank-1 game can be found fast (in polynomial time), and finding
all equilibria takes comparable time to finding a single equilibrium of a general
bimatrix game. Large rank-1 games are therefore attractive as detailed models of
interaction, on a similar scale to, but more general than, zero-sum games or lin-
ear programs. Rank-1 bimatrix games and their computational analysis should
therefore become a new tool in economic modeling.
The computational complexity (required running time) of computing a Nash
equilibrium of a game has received substantial interest in the last two decades.
A computational problem is considered tractable if it can be solved in polyno-
mial time. Savani and von Stengel (2006) showed that the algorithm by Lemke
and Howson (1964) may have exponential running time. Their examples may be
rare and comparable to exponential running times of the simplex algorithm for
linear programming (Klee and Minty, 1972), which works well in practice. The
path-following Lemke–Howson algorithm implies that finding an equilibrium of
a bimatrix game belongs to the complexity class PPAD defined by Papadimitriou
(1984). PPAD describes certain computational problems where the existence of a
solution is known, and the problem is to find one explicit solution.1 Other prob-
lems in PPAD include the computation of an approximate Brouwer fixed point,
and related problems in economics such as market equilibria (Vazirani and Yan-
nakakis, 2011), including the computation of an approximate Nash equilibrium of
a game with many players.2 A celebrated result is that all problems in PPAD can
be reduced to finding a Nash equilibrium in a bimatrix game, which makes this
problem “PPAD-complete” (Chen and Deng, 2006; Chen, Deng, and Teng, 2009;
Daskalakis, Goldberg, and Papadimitriou, 2009). No polynomial-time algorithm
for finding a Nash equilibrium of a general bimatrix game is known.
Kannan and Theobald (2010) introduced a hierarchy of bimatrix games based
on their rank, defined as the matrix rank of the sum of the two payoff matrices,
and described ways to find approximate Nash equilibria of games of fixed rank
(with exponential running time in the intended accuracy). In the present paper,
we prove that an exact Nash equilibrium of a rank-1 game can be found in poly-
nomial time, even though (another new result) a rank-1 game may have expo-
nentially many equilibria. Moreover, as has been proved separately (Mehta, 2014;
Chen and Paparas, 2019), games of rank 2 are PPAD-hard and thus as computa-
1In contrast, the better known complexity class NP applies to “decision problems” which have
a “yes” or “no” answer.
2In games with three or more players (unlike in two-player games), the mixed strategy prob-
abilities in a Nash equilibrium may be irrational numbers. A suitable concept for such games is
approximate Nash equilibrium, and finding an exact Nash equilibrium is an even harder compu-
tational problem (Etessami and Yannakakis, 2010).
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tionally difficult as general bimatrix games. In the context of the “rank” hierarchy,
rank-1 games are therefore the most complex type of games that are computation-
ally tractable.
Section 2 states the notation and preliminary results used in this paper. Its main
observation (Theorem 6) shows that the set of equilibria of a game of rank r is the
intersection of a hyperplane with a set of equilibria of parameterized games of
rank r− 1. When r = 1, these are parameterized zero-sum games whose equilib-
ria are the solutions to a parameterized linear program (LP), for which we recall
relevant results from Adler and Monteiro (1992) in Section 3. The intersection
with the hyperplane gives rise to the polynomial-time binary search for one equi-
librium of a rank-1 game, explained in Section 4. In Section 5, we describe com-
pletely the set of all Nash equilibria of a rank-1 game.3 Section 6 describes an
example (which may be useful to consult in between) that illustrates our main
results, and a second example that shows that binary search fails in general for
games of rank 2 or higher. A construction of rank-1 games with exponentially
many equilibria is shown in Section 7. In Section 8, we describe a variant of the
structure theorem of Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) with a new homeomorphism
between the space of bimatrix games and its equilibrium correspondence that
preserves the sum of the payoff matrices, and hence the rank of the games. In
the concluding Section 9, we present a tentative example of an economic model
based on rank-1 games, and note some open questions.
A preliminary version of our work appeared in Adsul, Garg, Mehta, and So-
honi (2011), and the result of Section 7 in von Stengel (2012). The mathematical
development in the present paper is almost entirely new in all parts.
2. BIMATRIX GAMES AND RANK REDUCTION
In this section we state our notation for bimatrix games and recall the “comple-
mentarity” characterization of Nash equilibria. For games of rank r (see Defini-
tion 3), our central observation is Theorem 6 which states that their set of Nash
equilibria is the intersection of a set N of equilibria of parameterized games of
rank r − 1 with a suitable hyperplane. In subsequent sections, we show how to
exploit this property algorithmically when r = 1.
We use the following notation. The transpose of a matrix C is written C>. All
vectors are column vectors, so if x ∈ Rm then x is an m × 1 matrix and x> is
the corresponding row vector in R1×m. In matrix products, scalars are treated
like 1× 1 matrices. Let 0 and 1 be vectors with all components equal to 0 and 1,
respectively, their dimension depending on the context. Inequalities like x ≥ 0
3The enumeration method in Theobald (2009) also considers a parameterized LP, but does not
provide or exploit our structural insights.
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hold for all components. The components of a vector x ∈ Rm are x1, . . . , xm.
For c ∈ Rk and γ ∈ R, a hyperplane is of the form {z ∈ Rk | c>z = γ}, and a
halfspace of the form {z ∈ Rk | c>z ≤ γ}. A polyhedron is an intersection of finitely
many halfspaces, and called a polytope if it is bounded. A face of a polyhedron P
is of the form P ∩ {z ∈ Rk | c>z = γ} where P ⊆ {z ∈ Rk | c>z ≤ γ}. It can
be shown that any face of P can be obtained by turning some of the inequalities
that define P into equalities (Schrijver, 1986, Section 8.3). If a face of P consists
of a single point, it is called a vertex of P. If S ⊆ X × Y for sets S, X, Y, then
{x ∈ X | (x, y) ∈ S for some y ∈ Y } is called the projection of S on X, also written
as {x | (x, y) ∈ S }.
A bimatrix game is a pair (A, B) of m× n matrices with rows as pure strategies
of player 1 and columns as pure strategies of player 2. The players simultane-
ously choose their pure strategies, with the corresponding entry of A as payoff
to player 1 and of B to player 2. The sets X and Y of mixed (that is, randomized)
strategies of player 1 and player 2 are given by
(1) X = {x ∈ Rm | x ≥ 0, 1>x = 1}, Y = {y ∈ Rn | y ≥ 0, 1>y = 1}.
For the mixed strategy pair (x, y) ∈ X×Y, the expected payoffs to the two players
are x>Ay and x>By, respectively. A best response x of player 1 against y maximizes
his expected payoff x>Ay, and a best response y of player 2 against x maximizes
her expected payoff x>By. A Nash equilibrium (NE) is a pair of mutual best re-
sponses. The following well-known characterization (Nash, 1951) states that x is
a best response to y if and only if every pure strategy i of player 1 that is played
with positive probability xi gives maximum expected payoff (Ay)i to player 1,
and similarly for player 2.
LEMMA 1 Let (A, B) be an m× n bimatrix game. Consider the polyhedra
(2)
P = {(x, v) ∈ X×R | B>x ≤ 1v },
Q = {(y, u) ∈ Y×R | Ay ≤ 1u }.
Let (x, y) ∈ X × Y. Then x is a best response to y if and only if (y, u) ∈ Q and for all
rows i
(3) xi = 0 or (Ay)i = u (1 ≤ i ≤ m),
and y is a best response to x if and only if (x, v) ∈ P and for all columns j
(4) yj = 0 or (B>x)j = v (1 ≤ j ≤ n).
If both conditions hold, then u and v are the unique payoffs to player 1 and 2 in the Nash
equilibrium (x, y).
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The following lemma states the well-known fact that the equilibria of a bimatrix
game are unchanged when subtracting a separate constant bj from each column j
of the row player’s payoff matrix.
LEMMA 2 Call two games strategically equivalent if they have the same Nash equi-
libria. If b ∈ Rn, then the m × n game (A, B) is strategically equivalent to the game
(A− 1b>, B).
PROOF: This holds by Lemma 1, because the equilibrium payoff u to player 1 in
the game (A, B) changes to u− b>y in (A− 1b>, B): Clearly, Ay ≤ 1u is equiva-
lent to (A− 1b>)y ≤ 1(u− b>y), and (Ay)i = u is equivalent to ((A− 1b>)y)i =
u− b>y.
The support of a mixed strategy is the set of pure strategies that are played
with positive probability. A bimatrix game is degenerate if there is a mixed strat-
egy that has more pure best responses than the size of its support (von Stengel,
2002). Among all m× n games, degenerate games form a set of measure zero, so
a “generic” game is nondegenerate. Most of our results hold for general games
that may be degenerate.
The object of study of our paper are bimatrix games of fixed rank, introduced by
Kannan and Theobald (2010), which generalize zero-sum games which are games
of rank zero.
DEFINITION 3 The rank of a bimatrix game (A, B) is the matrix rank of A + B.
LEMMA 4 An m× n bimatrix game of positive rank r can be written as (A, C + ab>)
for suitable a ∈ Rm, b ∈ Rn, and a game (A, C) of rank r− 1.
PROOF: An m× n matrix is of rank at most r if and only if it can be written as
the sum of r rank-1 matrices, that is, as a1b>1 + · · ·+ arb>r for suitable aq ∈ Rm and
bq ∈ Rn for 1 ≤ q ≤ r. This is easily seen by writing the jth column of the matrix
as ∑rq=1 aqbqj and letting b
>
q = (bq1, . . . , bqn) (see also Wardlaw (2005)). Suppose
(A, B) is of rank r, with A + B = ∑rq=1 aqb
>
q and therefore B = −A + ∑rq=1 aqb>q .
Let C = −A + ∑r−1q=1 aqb>q and a = ar, b = br, so that B = C + ab>; obviously,
A + C is of rank r− 1.
The following is a simple but central observation.
LEMMA 5 Let A, C ∈ Rm×n, x ∈ X, y ∈ Y, a ∈ Rm, b ∈ Rn, λ ∈ R. The following
are equivalent:
(a) (x, y) is an equilibrium of (A, C + ab>),
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(b) (x, y) is an equilibrium of (A, C + 1λb>) and x>a = λ,
(c) (x, y) is an equilibrium of (A− 1λb>, C + 1λb>) and x>a = λ.
PROOF: The equivalence of (a) and (b) holds because the players get in both
games the same expected payoffs for their pure strategies: this is immediate for
player 1, and if x>a = λ, then the column payoffs are given by
(5) x>(C + ab>) = x>C + λb> = x>C + x>1λb> = x>(C + 1λb>).
The games in (b) and (c) are strategically equivalent by Lemma 2.
Consider a game (A, B) of positive rank r where B = C+ ab> so that (A, C) is a
game of rank r− 1 according to Lemma 4. Then the game (A− 1λb>, C + 1λb>)
in Lemma 5(c) has the same sum A + C of its payoff matrices and hence also
rank r− 1, for any choice of the parameter λ. Let N be the set of Nash equilibria
together with λ of these parameterized games,
(6) N = {(λ, x, y) ∈ R× X×Y | (x, y) is a NE of (A− 1λb>, C + 1λb>)}
where by Lemma 5(b)
(7) N = {(λ, x, y) ∈ R× X×Y | (x, y) is a NE of (A, C + 1λb>)}.
These considerations imply the following main result of this section.
THEOREM 6 Given a bimatrix game (A, C + ab>), its set of Nash equilibria is exactly
the projection on X×Y of the intersection of N and the hyperplane H defined by
(8) H = {(λ, x, y) ∈ R×Rm ×Rn | x>a = λ} .
Theorem 6 asserts that for any rank-r game of the form (A, C + ab>), every
Nash equilibrium of the game is captured by the set N in (6) of games of rank
r − 1 which are parameterized by λ, intersected with the hyperplane H in (8).
Can this rank reduction be leveraged to get an efficient algorithm to find a Nash
equilibrium for a game of arbitrary constant rank? As will be discussed in Sec-
tion 6, this does not work in general. However, it does work for rank-1 games.
3. PARAMETERIZED LINEAR PROGRAMS
Our aim is to describe the equilibria of rank-1 games (A,−A + ab>) using the
rank reduction of the previous section. For this, we consider the set N in (7) for
C = −A,
(9) N = {(λ, x, y) ∈ R×Rm ×Rn | (x, y) is a NE of (A,−A + 1λb>)} ,
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where by (6)
(10) N = {(λ, x, y) ∈ R×Rm×Rn | (x, y) is a NE of (A− 1λb>,−A+ 1λb>)} ,
which is the set of equilibria of zero-sum games parameterized by λ. These corre-
spond to the solutions of a parameterized linear program (LP). In this section, we
review the structure of such parameterized LPs with a particular view towards
nongeneric cases and polynomial-time algorithms as studied by Adler and Mon-
teiro (1992). In essence, such parameterized LPs have finitely many special values
of the parameter λ called breakpoints. These separate the set N into a connected
sequence of polyhedral segments (which generically are line segments). They are
described in Theorem 15 in the next section, where we will present a polynomial-
time algorithm for finding one equilibrium of a rank-1 game. In the subsequent
section we present another algorithm for finding all equilibria.
We assume familiarity with notions of linear programming such as LP duality
and complementary slackness; see, for example, Schrijver (1986). The following
well-known lemma (Dantzig, 1963, p. 286) states that the equilibria of a zero-sum
game are the primal and dual solutions to an LP.
LEMMA 7 Consider an m× n zero-sum game (M,−M). In any equilibrium (x, y) of
this game, y is a minmax strategy of player 2, which is a solution to the LP with variables
y in Rn and u in R:
(11) maximize
y,u
u subject to My + 1u ≤ 0, y ∈ Y,
and x is a maxmin strategy of player 1, which is a solution to the dual LP to (11). For the
optimal value of u in (11), the maxmin payoff to player 1 and minmax cost to player 2
and hence value of the game is −u.
PROOF: The dual LP to (11) has variables x ∈ Rm and v ∈ R and states
(12) minimize
x,v
v subject to x>M + v1> ≥ 0, x ∈ X.
Both LPs are feasible (with sufficiently small u and large v). Let (y, u) be an op-
timal solution to (11) and (x, v) to (12). Then u = v by LP duality, and (11) and
(12) state My ≤ 1(−u), that is, player 2 pays no more than −u for any row,
and x>M ≥ (−v)1>, that is, player 1 gets at least −v in every column, where
−u = −v which is therefore the value of the game.
With the dual constraints written as as x>(−M) ≤ v1>, the complementary
slackness conditions between the primal and the dual are exactly the Nash equi-
librium conditions (3) and (4) of Lemma 1 (except for the changed sign of u so
that we do not have to write x ∈ X in (12) as −1>x = −1 and x ≥ 0). Hence,
(x, y) is a Nash equilibrium.
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Applied to M = A− 1λb> in (10), the LP (11) in Lemma 7 says:
(13) maximize
y,u
u subject to (A− 1λb>)y + 1u ≤ 0 , y ∈ Y.
In (13), the matrix A is parameterized. The substitution u = λb>y + t gives the
equivalent LP where only the objective function is parameterized:
(14) maximize
y,t
λb>y + t subject to Ay + 1t ≤ 0, y ∈ Y.
This is a standard parameterized linear programming problem. We stay close to
the notation of Adler and Monteiro (1992) who consider a primal LP with min-
imization subject to equality constraints, variables x, and a parameterized right
hand side, of which (14) is the dual, a maximization problem subject to inequal-
ities, with variables y, and a parameterized objective function. We write (14) as
(15) Dλ : maximize
y,t
λb>y + t subject to (y, t) ∈ D
with the fixed polyhedron
(16)
D = { (y, t) ∈ Rn ×R | Ay + 1t ≤ 0
1>y = 1
y ≥ 0 } .
The LP Dλ is the dual of the following LP Pλ with a parameterized right hand
side, where we use slack variables s ∈ Rn to express the inequality A>x + 1v ≥
bλ as an equality, in line with Adler and Monteiro (1992):
(17)
Pλ : minimizex,v,s v subject to A
>x + 1v− s = bλ
1>x = 1
x , s≥ 0 .
For optimal solutions (y, t) to Dλ and (x, v, s) to Pλ we have λb>y + t = v. The
next lemma (essentially a corollary to Lemma 5 and Lemma 7) states that −t and
v can be interpreted as the player’s payoffs for the games in Lemma 5(a) and (b),
and asserts that t, v, s are uniquely determined by (λ, x, y) (that is, a point on N ).
LEMMA 8 Let λ ∈ R. Then (x, y) is an equilibrium of the game (A,−A + 1λb>)
if and only if (y, t) is an optimal solution to Dλ in (15) for some t which is uniquely
determined by y, and (x, v, s) is an optimal solution to Pλ in (17) for some v and s which
are uniquely determined by λ and x. The equilibrium payoffs are −t to player 1 and v to
player 2. If x>a = λ, these are also the payoffs in the game (A,−A + ab>), and (x, y)
is an equilibrium of that game.
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PROOF: By Lemma 5 with C = −A, the game (A,−A + ab>) has the same
equilibria (x, y) and, by (5), payoffs as the game (A,−A + 1λb>) if x>a = λ.
Consider any optimal solutions (y, t) to Dλ and (x, v, s) to Pλ. Then Ay + 1t ≤ 0
states for each row i of A the inequality (Ay)i ≤ −t. Complementary slackness,
equivalent to LP optimality, states that (Ay)i = −t whenever xi > 0. This is the
equilibrium condition in (3) that states that x is a best response to y. Because it
holds for at least one i, it uniquely determines−t, which is the equilibrium payoff
to player 1 in the above games.
Similarly, the constraint s = A>x− bλ+ 1v in (17) means that s is determined
by (x,λ, v), and states sj = (A>x− bλ)j + v ≥ 0 for all j, or equivalently ((−A>+
bλ1>)x)j ≤ v. Complementary slackness, equivalent to LP optimality, states that
this inequality is tight whenever yj > 0. This is the condition (4) that states that y
is a best response to x in the game (A,−A+ 1λb>), and it uniquely determines v
as the equilibrium payoff to player 2.
Primal-dual pairs Pλ, Dλ of LPs with a parameter λ have been studied since
Gass and Saaty (1955). The next result is well known, which we show following
Jansen, De Jong, Roos, and Terlaky (1997).
LEMMA 9 For λ ∈ R, let φ(λ) be the optimum value of Pλ and hence of Dλ. Then
φ : R → R is the pointwise maximum of a finite number of affine functions on R and
therefore piecewise linear and convex.
PROOF: The optimum of Dλ exists for any λ and is taken at a vertex of the
polyhedron D in (16). Let V be the set of vertices of D, which is finite. Hence,
(18) φ(λ) = max{λ(b>y) + t | (y, t) ∈ V}
where for each of the finitely many (y, t) in V the function λ 7→ λ(b>y) + t is
affine. Hence, φ is the pointwise maximum of a finite number of affine functions
as claimed. The epigraph of φ given by E = {(λ, θ) | θ ≥ φ(λ)} is the intersection
of the convex epigraphs of these affine functions, so E is convex and φ is a convex
function.
By (18), the function φ(λ) is the “upper envelope” of the affine functions λ 7→
λ(b>y) + t defined by the vertices (y, t) of D. A breakpoint is any λ∗ so that φ(λ)
has different left and right derivatives when λ approaches λ∗ from below or
above, denoted by φ′−(λ∗) and φ′+(λ∗), respectively.
For any LP L, say, let OptFace(L) be the face of the domain of L where its opti-
mum is attained. For any λ we denote OptFace(Dλ) by Y(λ), that is,
(19) Y(λ) = { (y, t) ∈ D | λb>y + t = φ(λ)} .
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Then the left and right derivatives of φ at λ are characterized as follows (obvious
from (18), also Prop. 2.4 of Adler and Monteiro (1992)):
(20)
φ′−(λ) = min{ b>y | (y, t) ∈ Y(λ)} ,
φ′+(λ) = max{ b>y | (y, t) ∈ Y(λ)} ,
which are the optima of the two LPs
(21)
SLmin(λ) : minimize
y,t
b>y subject to (y, t) ∈ Y(λ) ,
SLmax(λ) : maximize
y,t
b>y subject to (y, t) ∈ Y(λ) .
That is, λ∗ is a breakpoint if and only if φ′−(λ∗) < φ′+(λ∗). Clearly, in that case
there are at least two vertices (y, t) and (yˆ, tˆ) of D that define two different affine
functions λ 7→ λ(b>y) + t and λ 7→ λ(b>yˆ) + tˆ that meet at λ = λ∗ to define the
maximum φ(λ∗) in (18). These are also vertices of Y(λ∗), which is then a higher-
dimensional face (such as an edge) of D. The following central observation shows
that the breakpoints give all the information about the optimal faces Y(λ) of Dλ
for any λ between these breakpoints.
THEOREM 10 (Adler and Monteiro, 1992, Theorem 4.1) Let λ1, . . . ,λK be the
breakpoints, in increasing order, for the parameterized LPs Pλ and Dλ, and let λ0 = −∞
and λK+1 = ∞. For 0 ≤ k ≤ K, consider any λ′k ∈ (λk,λk+1). Then Y(λ′k) =
OptFace(SLmax(λk)) for 1 ≤ k ≤ K, and Y(λ′k) = OptFace(SLmin(λk+1)) for 0 ≤
k ≤ K− 1.
For finding the solutions to Pλ as a function of λ, the nondegenerate case is
straightforward, where Y(λ) is a vertex of Dλ unless λ is a breakpoint, in which
case Y(λ) is an edge of Dλ. Then these vertices uniquely describe the pieces of the
piecewise linear function φ(λ), and can be traversed by a parameterized simplex
algorithm Gass and Saaty (1955). An example is shown in the right diagram of
Figure 3 below with the constraints (42) for Ay+ 1t ≤ 0 in D, with the additional
constraints 0 ≤ y2 ≤ 1 to represent y ∈ Y, and objective function λb>y + t given
by λ(1− 2y2) + t. The three linear parts of φ(λ) are
(22) φ(λ) =

−λ− 1 for λ ≤ −12
−12 for − 12 ≤ λ ≤ 12
λ− 1 for 12 ≤ λ
which correspond to the optimal vertices (y2, t) of D given by (1,−1), (12 ,−12),
and (0,−1). The two breakpoints are λ1 = −12 and λ2 = 12 which correspond to
the two edges of D.
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In the degenerate case, one typically does not get polynomial-time algorithms
by considering vertices and corresponding basic solutions to the LP Pλ as in a
parameterized simplex algorithm. Instead of partitioning the variables of Pλ into
basic and nonbasic variables, Adler and Monteiro (1992) consider “optimal par-
titions”; we use here only the partition part that replaces the nonbasic variables,
which we denote by M(λ) ∪ N(λ) in (24) below (called N(λ) in Adler and Mon-
teiro (1992)). This is the set of variables of the dual LP Dλ that may be strictly
positive in an optimal solution, which represent the “true inequalities” of Y(λ).
DEFINITION 11 For some A, b, C, d suppose that the constraints in x
(23) Ax ≤ b, Cx = d
are feasible. Then any row i of Ax ≤ b so that (b− Ax)i > 0 for some feasible x is called
a true inequality of (23).
If there are solutions x and xˆ to (23) so that (b− Ax)i > 0 and (b− Axˆ)j > 0
then both inequalities are true for x 12 + xˆ
1
2 , so there is a unique largest set of true
inequalities with some feasible solution where all these strict inequalities hold
simultaneously. These define the relative interior of the polyhedron defined by
(23).
Let A ∈ Rm×n and b ∈ Rn. Let M(λ) ∪ N(λ) be the set of true inequalities of
the optimal face Y(λ) of Dλ in (15), that is,
(24)
M(λ) = { i ∈ {1, . . . , m} | (Ay)i + t< 0 for some (y, t) ∈ Y(λ) } ,
N(λ) = { j ∈ {1, . . . , n} | yj > 0 for some (y, t) ∈ Y(λ) } .
Any non-true inequality of Y(λ) is always tight, that is, (Ay)i + t = 0 if i 6∈ M(λ)
and yj = 0 if j 6∈ N(λ). It can be shown that for such i and j there are optimal
solutions (x, v, s) to Pλ where xi > 0 and sj > 0, so these are the true inequalities
of OptFace(Pλ). This is also known as “strict complementary slackness” (Schrijver,
1986, Section 7.9). Consider the polyhedron P of the constraints for Pλ in (17)
where λ is allowed to vary,
(25) P = {(λ, x, v, s) ∈ R×Rm×R×Rn | A>x+ 1v− s = bλ, x ∈ X, s ≥ 0 } .
The following lemma considers the face of P defined by the equations xi = 0 for
i ∈ M(λ) and sj = 0 for j ∈ N(λ), which are necessary and sufficient for a feasible
solution to Pλ to be optimal. This is immediate from the standard complementary
slackness condition.
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LEMMA 12 Let A ∈ Rm×n and b ∈ Rn. For M ⊆ {1, . . . , m} and N ⊆ {1, . . . , n},
with xM = (xi)i∈M and sN = (sj)j∈N, define
(26) P(M, N) = {(λ, x, v, s) ∈ P | xM = 0, sN = 0 } .
Then any feasible solution (x, v, s) to Pλ is optimal if and only if (λ, x, v, s) ∈ P(M(λ), N(λ)).
Crucially, according to Theorem 10, for any λ in an open interval (λk,λk+1) (for
0 ≤ k ≤ K) the optimal face Y(λ) is constant in λ. Hence, for all λ ∈ (λk,λk+1)
the true inequalities (M(λ), N(λ)) of Y(λ) are equal to some fixed (M, N), and
for the points (λ, x, v, s) in P(M, N) the value of λ can be any real in the closed
interval [λk,λk+1]. Namely, with the LPs
(27)
BRmax(M, N) : maximize
λ,x,v,s
λ subject to (λ, x, v, s) ∈ P(M, N) ,
BRmin(M, N) : minimize
λ,x,v,s
λ subject to (λ, x, v, s) ∈ P(M, N) ,
the following holds.
LEMMA 13 Consider λ0,λ1, . . . ,λK,λK+1 and λ′k ∈ (λk,λk+1) for 0 ≤ k ≤ K as in
Theorem 10. Let Mk = M(λ′k) and N
k = N(λ′k) (which do not depend on the choice of
λ′k). Then for 1 ≤ k ≤ K,
(a) the breakpoint λk is the optimum of the LP BRmax(Mk−1, Nk−1) and of the LP
BRmin(Mk, Nk);
(b) if (λ, x, v, s) ∈ P(M(λk), N(λk)) then λ = λk .
PROOF: See Adler and Monteiro (1992), p. 171 for (a), and Theorem 3.1(a) and
Lemma 3.1(b) for (b).
Lemma 13(a) implies that for any λ in the open interval (λk,λk+1), for 1 ≤ k ≤
K − 1, the endpoints of the closed interval [λk,λk+1] are given by the minimum
and maximum of λ for (λ, x, v, s) ∈ P(M, N) where M = M(λ) and N = N(λ).
Lemma 13(b) and Lemma 12 imply that if λ is itself a breakpoint, then P(M, N) =
{λ} ×OptFace(Pλ).
As we will describe in detail in the next section, Theorem 10 and Lemma 13 lead
to a description of the set of optimal solutions to Pλ and Dλ for all λ with the help
of the breakpoints λ1, . . . ,λK in the form of 2K+ 1 polyhedral segments (which are
lines in the nondegenerate case). Any solution (x, v, s) to Pλ is optimal if and only
if (λ, x, v, s) belongs to P(M(λ), N(λ)), which is a face of P, and any solution to
Dλ is optimal if and only if it belongs to Y(λ), which is a face of D. For λ between
two breakpoints, these faces do not change (but x typically varies with λ), and
their Cartesian product defines K+ 1 of the segments. If λ is equal to a breakpoint,
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the set P(M(λ), N(λ)) is a subset of the two adjoining faces P(M(λ′), N(λ′)) for
λ′ near λ, whereas Y(λ) is a superset of the adjoining faces Y(λ′), as described in
Theorem 10. This defines the other K segments. Using this we will give a precise
description of the set N in Theorem 15 below.
Adler and Monteiro (1992) describe how to generate the breakpoints of Pλ, Dλ
in polynomial time per breakpoint, with a polynomial-time algorithm applied to
the LPs (15), (21), (27), which we will adapt to our purpose. (However, the number
of breakpoints may be exponential, see Murty (1980).) The true inequalities in
Definition 11 can also be found with an LP, according to the following lemma
(Prop. 4.1 of Adler and Monteiro (1992)), due to Freund, Roundy, and Todd (1985);
for an alternative polynomial-time algorithm see Mehrotra and Ye (1993).
LEMMA 14 For A, b, C, d and the constraints (23) consider the LP
(28)
maximize
x,u,α
1>u subject to Ax + u− bα≤ 0,
Cx− dα= 0,
0 ≤ u≤ 1,
α≥ 1.
Then (23) is feasible if and only if (28) is feasible and bounded, and any optimal solution
(x∗, u∗, α∗) to (28) satisfies u∗i = 1 (and u
∗
i = 0 otherwise) if and only if i is a true
inequality of (23). For such an optimal solution (x∗, u∗, α∗) to (28), x = x∗(1/α∗) is a
solution to (23) where (b− Ax)i > 0 for all true inequalities i.
PROOF: If the LP (28) is feasible then it is also bounded because u ≤ 1. Let I
be the set of true inequalities of (23), that is, (b − Ax)i = εi > 0 for i ∈ I for
some x with Cx = d. Choose α∗ ≥ 1 so that α∗ ≥ 1/εi for all i ∈ I. Then (bα∗ −
A(xα∗))i = (b− Ax)iα∗ = εiα∗ ≥ 1 for i ∈ I. Hence, x∗ = xα∗ and u∗ defined by
u∗i = 1 if i ∈ I, and u∗i = 0 otherwise, give a feasible solution (x∗, u∗, α∗) to the
LP (28). This solution is also optimal because any solution (xˆ, uˆ, αˆ) to (28) where
uˆi > 0 would give a solution x = xˆ(1/αˆ) to (23) with (b − Axˆ)i > 0 and thus
i ∈ I, so for any feasible solution (x, u, α) to (28) we have ui = 0 whenever i 6∈ I.
This proves the claim.
4. FINDING ONE EQUILIBRIUM OF A RANK-1 GAME BY BINARY SEARCH
We use the results of the previous section to present a polynomial-time algo-
rithm for finding one equilibrium of a rank-1 game (A,−A + ab>), using binary
search for a suitable value of the parameter λ in Theorem 6. The search main-
tains a pair of successively closer parameter values and corresponding equilibria
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of the game (A,−A + 1λb>) that are on opposite sides of the hyperplane H in
(8). Generically, the set N in (9) is a piecewise linear path which has to intersect
H between these two parameter values. In general, the segments of that “path”
are products of certain faces of the polyhedra D in (15) and P in (25) described in
Theorem 10 and Lemma 13 using the breakpoints λ1, . . . ,λK of the LPs Pλ and Dλ.
We give a complete description of N in terms of these faces of P and D, which
we project to R× X (for the possible values of (λ, x)) and Y. Namely, consider
λ0,λ1, . . . ,λK,λK+1 and λ′k ∈ (λk,λk+1) for 0 ≤ k ≤ K as in Theorem 10. For
0 ≤ k ≤ K, define
(29) X′k = {(λ, x) | (λ, x, v, s) ∈ P(M(λ′k), N(λ′k)) } .
Note that for any (λ, x, v, s) ∈ P(M(λ′), N(λ′)) (for any λ′ ∈ R) the components
v and s are uniquely determined by (λ, x) by Lemma 8. Similarly, let
(30) Y′k = {y | (y, t) ∈ Y(λ′k) }
where again t in (y, t) is uniquely determined by y. Recall that the choice of λ′k ∈
(λk,λk+1) does not matter for the definitions of X′k and Y
′
k. The polyhedra X
′
k×Y′k
for 0 ≤ k ≤ K (which for k = 0 and k = K + 1 are infinite, otherwise bounded)
represent K + 1 of the segments that constitute N between any two breakpoints
λk and λk+1. They are successively connected by K further segments, which are
polytopes Xk × Yk that correspond to the breakpoints themselves. These are for
1 ≤ k ≤ K defined by
(31) Xk = {(λ, x) | (λ, x, v, s) ∈ P(M(λk), N(λk)) }
and
(32) Yk = {y | (y, t) ∈ Y(λk) } .
THEOREM 15 The set N in (9) is given by
(33) N = (X′0 ×Y′0) ∪
K⋃
k=1
(
(Xk ×Yk) ∪ (X′k ×Y′k)
)
,
where for 1 ≤ k ≤ K we have
(34) Yk ⊇ Y′k−1 ∪Y′k
and
(35) Xk ⊆ X′k−1 ∩ X′k .
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PROOF: This follows from Lemma 8, Lemma 12, and Theorem 10. By Theo-
rem 10, Y(λ′k) is the optimal face of SL
max(λk) which is a subset of Y(λk). Hence,
Y′k ⊆ Yk, and similarly Y′k−1 ⊆ Yk, which implies (34). In addition, we have
M(λ′k) ⊆ M(λk) and N(λ′k) ⊆ N(λk) and thus Xk ⊆ X′k because of the additional
tight constraints in P(M(λk), N(λk)). Similarly, Xk ⊆ X′k−1. This shows (35).
The preceding characterization of N is used in the following lemma.
LEMMA 16 Let λ 6 λ and x, x ∈ X and y, y ∈ Y so that for N in (9)
(36) (λ, x, y) ∈ N , λ 6 x>a , (λ, x, y) ∈ N , x>a 6 λ .
Then x>a = λ for some (λ, x, y) ∈ N with λ ∈ [λ,λ].
PROOF: Consider the largest λ∗ so that λ∗ ∈ [λ,λ] and there are x∗, y∗ with
(λ∗, x∗, y∗) ∈ N and λ∗ ≤ x∗>a, which exists since λ fulfills this property and N
is closed by Theorem 15.
If λ∗ = λ then both (λ∗, x) and (λ∗, x∗) belong to the same set Xk or X′k which
is convex, where since x>a ≤ λ∗ and λ∗ ≤ x∗>a we have x>a = λ∗ for a suitable
convex combination x of x and x∗, and (λ∗, x, y∗) ∈ N , as claimed.
Hence, we can assume λ∗ < λ. Suppose λ∗ is a breakpoint λk, so that (λ∗, x∗) ∈
Xk. Consider λ′ ∈ (λk, min{λk+1,λ}) and (λ′, x′, y′) ∈ X′k × Y′k where λ′ > x′>a
by maximality of λ∗. By (35), we have (λ∗, x∗) ∈ X′k and hence (λ∗, x∗, y′) ∈ X′k ×
Y′k. Because λ
∗ ≤ x∗>a and λ′ > x′>a, a suitable convex combination (λ, x, y′)
of (λ∗, x∗, y′) and (λ′, x′, y′) belongs to N and fulfills λ = x>a as claimed (in
fact, (λ, x, y′) = (λ∗, x∗, y′) does by maximality of λ∗). If λ∗ is not a breakpoint,
we directly have (λ∗, x∗, y∗) ∈ X′k × Y′k for some k and can choose (λ′, x′, y∗) ∈
X′k ×Y′k with λ∗ < λ′ ≤ λ and apply the same argument.
The binary search algorithm will maintain (36) as an invariant while halving the
length of the interval [λ,λ] in each iteration.
Lemma 16 ensures that the interval contains some λ with (λ, x, y) ∈ N and
x>a = λ (which is not true when applied to games of higher rank, as shown in
the example in Figure 4 below). Let λ′ = (λ+ λ)/2 and let x′ be the strategy of
player 1 in an equilibrium (x′, y′) of the game (A,−A + 1λ′b>), which is found
as a solution (x′, v′, s′) to Pλ′ . If λ′ ≤ x′>a, it is natural to proceed with λ set to λ′
(written as λ ← λ′), otherwise with λ ← λ′. The binary search should terminate
once λ and λ are in the same interval [λk,λk+1] between two breakpoints, with
the desired equilibrium found in (X′k ×Y) ∩ H.
However, this straightforward approach has the following problems:
(i) x′ in a solution (x′, v′, s′) to Pλ′ may not be unique;
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(ii) the search may converge to an equilibrium (x, y) with x>a = λ where λ is a
breakpoint λk, so that λ and λ are always in different intervals (λk−1,λk] and
[λk,λk+1) and the described termination condition fails;
(iii) the number of digits to describe λ and λ may pile up, which slows down
solving Pλ′ .
We address these problems as follows. First, we identify with M = M(λ′), N =
N(λ′) the face P(M, N) of P that contains (λ′, x′, v′, s′). We then check if that
face contains some (λ, x, v, s) with x>a = λ. Depending on whether λ′ ≤ x′>a
or x′>a ≤ λ′, this is achieved by one of the following variations of the LPs in (27)
(which will also be used for the enumeration of all equilibria in Section 5):
(37)
P max(M, N, a,λ′) : maximize
λ,x,v,s
λ− x>a
subject to (λ, x, v, s) ∈ P(M, N) ,
λ′ ≤ λ ≤ x>a ,
P min(M, N, a,λ′) : minimize
λ,x,v,s
λ− x>a
subject to (λ, x, v, s) ∈ P(M, N) ,
x>a ≤ λ ≤ λ′ .
Figure 1 illustrates P max(M, N, a,λ′) where λ′ < x′>a, and λ′ is between two
breakpoints λk−1 and λ′k (but λ
′ could also be a breakpoint itself), so that P(M, N)
is projected to X′k−1. In the left diagram, x
′ is not unique, but λ′ < x′>a holds for
any x′ in a solution to Pλ′ , and X′k−1 ∩Y intersects H. In the right diagram, it does
not, and P max(M, N, a,λ′) returns λ∗ = λ′ as shown by the dot, discussed further
below.
The next lemma states that the appropriate LP in (37) identifies if there is an
equilibrium (x, y) of the game (A,−A + 1λb>) with x>a = λ for some λ between
λ′ and the next breakpoint λk.
LEMMA 17 Let λk be a breakpoint of Pλ and Dλ as in Theorem 10, 1 ≤ k ≤ K. Let
λ′ ∈ R, let (x′, v′, s′) be an optimal solution to Pλ′ , and let (M, N) = (M(λ′), N(λ′))
as in (24).
(a) Suppose λ′ ∈ (λk−1,λk] and λ′ ≤ x′>a. Let (λ∗, x∗, v∗, s∗) be an optimal solution
to P max(M, N, a,λ′). Then λ∗ ∈ [λ′,λk], and the game (A,−A + 1λb>) has an
equilibrium (x, y) with x>a = λ for some λ ∈ [λ′,λk] if and only if this holds for
λ = λ∗ and x = x∗.
(b) Suppose λ′ ∈ [λk,λk+1) and λ′ ≥ x′>a. Let (λ∗, x∗, v∗, s∗) be an optimal solution
to P min(M, N, a,λ′). Then λ∗ ∈ [λk,λ′], and the game (A,−A + 1λb>) has an
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λ
λk−1
λ′
λˆ
λk
x>a
P(M, N)
constraint set of
P max(M, N, a,λ′)
x
λ
λk−1
λ′ λ∗
λk
x>a
P(M, N)
x
FIGURE 1.— Illustration of P max(M, N, a,λ′) in (37) for λ′ ∈ (λk−1,λk), with
M = M(λ′), N = N(λ′), and P(M, N) as its projection X′k−1. In the left diagram,
P(M, N) is not just line segment, which contains some (λ, x, v, s) and (λ, xˆ, vˆ, sˆ)
with x>a < λ < xˆ>a, namely for λ = λˆ but not for λ = λ′ or λ = λk. In the right
diagram, we always have λ < x>a, and P max(M, N, a,λ′) attains its optimum λ∗
at λ′ (rather than the more useful λk).
equilibrium (x, y) with x>a = λ for some λ ∈ [λk,λ′] if and only if this holds for
λ = λ∗ and x = x∗.
PROOF: We prove (a), where (b) is entirely analogous. By Lemma 12, (λ′, x′, v′, s′)
is feasible for P max(M, N, a,λ′). Clearly λ′ ≤ λ∗, and Lemma 13 implies λ∗ ≤
λk. Because λ ≤ x>a for any feasible solution (λ, x, v, s), the objective function
λ − x>a is nonpositive, and zero and hence optimal if and only if λ = x>a, in
which case x is part of the described equilibrium (x, y).
We now describe the BINSEARCH algorithm in Figure 2, where will return to
the LPs in (37). The conditions x>a = λ and x ∈ X mean that λ is a convex
combination of the components a1, . . . , am of a, so that we can initialize λ and λ
as their minimum and maximum in line 3 of the algorithm. The main loop of the
algorithm is between lines 4 and 18. The candidate value for λ (called λ′ in the
above explanations) is the midpoint between λ and λ in line 5. Line 6 computes
some optimal solution (x, v, s) of the LP Pλ in (17), where the dual LP Dλ in (15)
is typically solved alongside Pλ. The optimum φ(λ) of Pλ and Dλ determines the
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BINSEARCH
1 Input: A ∈ Rm×n, a ∈ Rm, b ∈ Rn
2 Output: one Nash equilibrium of the game (A,−A + ab>)
3 λ← min{a1, . . . , am}, λ← max{a1, . . . , am}
4 repeat
5 λ← (λ+ λ)/2
6 (x, v, s)← solution of Pλ
7 (M, N)← (M(λ), N(λ))
8 if λ ≤ x>a then
9 (λ∗, x∗, v∗, s∗)← solution of P max(M, N, a,λ)
10 if λ∗ < x∗>a then
11 (λ∗, x∗, v∗, s∗)← solution of BRmax(M, N)
12 λ← λ∗
13 else [ know: x>a < λ ]
14 (λ∗, x∗, v∗, s∗)← solution of P min(M, N, a,λ)
15 if x∗>a < λ∗ then
16 (λ∗, x∗, v∗, s∗)← solution of BRmin(M, N)
17 λ← λ∗
18 until x∗>a = λ∗
19 (y∗, t∗)← solution of Dλ∗
20 output (x∗, y∗)
FIGURE 2.— The BINSEARCH algorithm for finding one Nash equilibrium of a
rank-1 game (A,−A + ab>).
optimal face Y(λ) of Dλ in (19). The true inequalities M, N of Y(λ) in line 7 are
determined according to (24), for example with the help of the LP in Lemma 14.
Lines 8 to 12, and symmetrically 13 to 17, use the LPs in (37). In order to match
the notation in the discussion before Lemma 17, let λ′ = λ. Consider the case
λ′ ≤ x>a, handled in lines 8 to 12. Line 9 invokes the LP P max(M, N, a,λ′). By
Lemma 17, the optimum (λ∗, x∗, v∗, s∗) to this LP will find the desired equilibrium
with λ∗ = x∗>a if there is one for some λ∗ up to the next breakpoint λk, that is,
for λ∗ ∈ [λ′,λk]. Suppose this is not the case, that is, λ∗ < x∗>a and the optimum
λ∗ − x∗>a of P max(M, N, a,λ′) is negative. By Lemma 17, in this case the next
breakpoint λk does not define an equilibrium, so that problem (ii) above does not
occur. However, as shown in the right diagram in Figure 1, this may result in
λ∗ = λ′ . We could simply continue with λ ← λ∗ as in line 12, but if λ∗ = λ′
this increases the description size of λ which we would like to keep bounded
to avoid problem (iii) (the description size of λ probably increases only by one
bit per main iteration, but it is useful to keep it independent of the number of
iterations both for the computation and for the analysis). In line 10, the condition
λ∗ < x∗>a recognizes that the current segment ofN contains no equilibrium, and
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then BRmax(M, N) in line 11 computes λ∗ as the next breakpoint λk according to
Lemma 13(a); the LP in line 11 can be solved by starting from the current solution
to P max(M, N, a,λ′). The left diagram in Figure 1 shows that we cannot simply
replace the objective function λ− x>a of P max(M, N, a,λ′) by λ: While this would
compute the next breakpoint λk , it may overlook that the current segment of
N defined by P(M, N) intersects the hyperplane H, which would possibly miss
the equilibrium altogether, for example if λ = λˆ as shown in the diagram (in
particular if λ still has its initial value, which is not checked in the algorithm
whether it produces an equilibrium).
In summary: lines 8 to 11 find λ∗ and x∗ so that either (a) x∗>a = λ∗, or (b)
λ∗ < x∗>a and λ∗ is a breakpoint and (λ+ λ)/2 = λ ≤ λ∗ < λ, which implies
λ − λ∗ ≤ (λ − λ)/2 . The next value of λ is set to λ∗ in line 12. In case (a), the
loop terminates in line 18. In case (b), the loop continues, and in the next iteration
the difference λ − λ has shrunk by at least one half. The analogous statements
hold for lines 13–17. The following theorem states the correctness and polynomial
running time of the algorithm.
THEOREM 18 Algorithm BINSEARCH finds one equilibrium of the rank-1 game (A,−A+
ab>). Assume that the entries of A, a, b are rational numbers with combined bit size B,
and that LPs are solved with polynomial-time solvers that return extreme LP solutions
obtained from linear equations derived from A, a, b. Then BINSEARCH runs in polyno-
mial time in B.
PROOF: During the main loop, the invariant (36) is preserved, and the length of
the interval [λ,λ] shrinks by at least a factor of two per iteration. By Lemma 16, a
solution (λ, x, y) ∈ N with x>a = λ and λ ∈ [λ,λ] is guaranteed to exist. The ter-
mination condition x∗>a = λ∗ in line 18 holds once λ reaches a segment ofN that
intersects H, which is identified with one of the LPs in line 9 or 14 by Lemma 17.
Because the length of the search interval [λ,λ] shrinks by at least half in each iter-
ation, the search interval eventually contains at most one breakpoint λk. If there
is no breakpoint in [λ,λ], then (M(λ), N(λ)) = (M(λ), N(λ)) = (M(λ), N(λ))
for λ = (λ+ λ)/2. Hence, a solution (λ∗, x∗, v∗, s∗) to P max(M(λ), N(λ), a,λ) or
to P min(M(λ), N(λ), a,λ) determines an equilibrium (x∗, y∗) to (A,−A + ab>)
by Lemma 17 and Lemma 5. This holds also if there is a single breakpoint λk
in [λ,λ]. Hence, as claimed, the algorithm computes an equilibrium (x∗, y∗) of
(A,−A + ab>).
The number of overall iterations is polynomial for the following reason. Any
breakpoint λ is part of a vertex (λ, x, v, s) of P by Lemma 13(a). This vertex is a so-
lution to a linear system of equations where each component (such as λ) is a frac-
tion with an integer determinant obtained from A, b in the denominator (which
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has a polynomial of bits), and distinct fractions for different breakpoints λ. Hence,
any two breakpoints have minimum distance 1/2p(B) for some polynomial p (see
also (Schrijver, 1986, Section 10.2)). Therefore, there will be at most O(p(B)) bi-
nary search iterations until the search interval contains at most one breakpoint
and the search terminates.
Each iteration of the algorithm solves three or four LPs. The first is Pλ in line 6.
Using the optimum φ(λ) of that LP, in line 7 the true inequalities in (24) of Y(λ) in
(19) are found with another LP as in Lemma 14. The third LP is either P max(M, N, a,λ)
in line 9 or P min(M, N, a,λ) in line 14. The fourth LP is either BRmax(M, N) or
BRmin(M, N) in line 11 or 16, respectively (which just relaxes the extra constraints
of the previous LP in (37) and has a different objective function). In all cases, the
output λ∗ is described in terms of A, a, b and found in polynomial time in the bit
size B, and λ∗ itself has polynomial bit size (Schrijver, 1986, Corollary 10.2a(iii)).
In the next iteration, λ∗ determines with the constant arithmetic expression in
line 5 the next parameter λ for Pλ in line 6 and for (M, N) in line 7 so that the bit
size of λ remains polynomial in B. Hence, each main iteration takes polynomial
time, and the overall running time is polynomial.
In practice, as observed in (Adler and Monteiro, 1992, Section 5), in the nonde-
generate case the segments of N are line segments. Then the LP in line 9 or 14 is
solved starting from the current solution to Pλ in line 6 with a single pivot, and
similarly the next LP in line 11 or 16.
5. ENUMERATING ALL EQUILIBRIA OF A RANK-1 GAME
In this section, we show how to obtain a complete description of all Nash equi-
libria of a rank-1 game with the help of Theorem 6 and Theorem 15.
A degenerate bimatrix game may have infinite sets of Nash equilibria. They
can be described via maximal Nash subsets (Jansen, 1981), called “sub-solutions”
by Nash (1951). A Nash subset for (A, B) is a nonempty product set S× T where
S ⊆ X and T ⊆ Y so that every (x, y) in S× T is an equilibrium of (A, B); in other
words, any two equilibrium strategies x ∈ S and y ∈ T are “exchangeable”. Using
the “best response polyhedra” P and Q in (2), it can be shown that any maximal
Nash subset S× T is a polytope, with S as a suitable face of P projected to X, and
T as a suitable face of Q projected to Y (Avis, Rosenberg, Savani, and von Stengel,
2010). These faces are defined by converting some inequalities in (2) to equations,
which have to fulfill the equilibrium conditions (3) and (4). The usual output for
“enumerating” all equilibria consists of listing all maximal Nash subsets S × T
via the vertices of S and T. These are vertices of P and Q, respectively (projected
to X and Y) that define the “extreme” Nash equilibria of (A, B), with maximal
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Nash subsets obtained as maximally exchangeable sets of such vertices (Avis,
Rosenberg, Savani, and von Stengel, 2010, Prop. 4). Maximal Nash subsets may
intersect, in which case their vertex sets intersect. In a nondegenerate game, all
maximal Nash subsets are singletons.
For a rank-1 game (A,−A + ab>), its set of Nash equilibria is N ∩ H projected
to X × Y by Theorem 6, with N in (9) and H in (8). By (33), N is the union of
polyhedra, whose nonempty intersections with H give almost directly the maxi-
mal Nash subsets.
THEOREM 19 Let (A,−A+ ab>) be a rank-1 bimatrix game, and let λ0,λ1, . . . ,λK,λK+1
and λ′k ∈ (λk,λk+1) for 0 ≤ k ≤ K as in Theorem 10. With (29), (30), (31), (32), let
(38)
Sk = { x | (λ, x) ∈ Xk , x>a = λ } (1 ≤ k ≤ K),
Lk = { λ | (λ, x) ∈ Xk , x>a = λ } (1 ≤ k ≤ K),
S′k = { x | (λ, x) ∈ X′k , x>a = λ } (0 ≤ k ≤ K),
L′k = { λ | (λ, x) ∈ X′k , x>a = λ } (0 ≤ k ≤ K).
Then the maximal Nash subsets of (A,−A + ab>) are the sets Sk × Yk if Sk 6= ∅, and
S′k ×Y′k if S′k 6= ∅ and L′k is not equal to {λk} or {λk+1}.
PROOF: Each set Sk is the projection of (Xk × Yk) ∩ H on X, and S′k is the pro-
jection of (X′k × Y′k) ∩ H on X, with Lk and L′k containing the corresponding set
of λ’s. Hence, by Theorem 15, if Sk 6= ∅ then Sk × Yk is a Nash subset, and if
S′k 6= ∅ then S′k × Y′k is a Nash subset, and the union of these is the set of all
equilibria which is the projection of N ∩ H on X × Y by Theorem 6. The only
question is which of these Nash subsets are inclusion-maximal. By (Adler and
Monteiro, 1992, Corollary 3.2), Yk ∩Yk+1 = Y′k where Yk and Yk+1 contain Y′k prop-
erly, Yk ∩ Y` = ∅ whenever |k − `| ≥ 2, and Y′k ∩ Y′` = ∅ whenever k 6= `, and
Lemma 13 implies Lk = {λk} = Lk−1 ∩ Lk. So the only possible inclusions are that
S′k×Y′k is a subset of Sk×Yk or of Sk+1×Yk+1. Suppose x ∈ S′k, that is, (λ, x) ∈ X′k
and x>a = λ. If this implies λ = λk then L′k = {λk}. By Lemma 12, this means x
is part of an optimal solution (x, v, s) to Pλk and hence x ∈ Sk, which shows the
proper inclusion S′k × Y′k ⊂ Sk × Yk because Y′k ⊂ Yk. Similarly, L′k = {λk+1} im-
plies S′k×Y′k ⊂ Sk×Yk+1. These are the only possible inclusions because if x ∈ S′k
with (λ, x) ∈ X′k so that x>a = λ 6∈ {λk,λk+1}we clearly cannot have x ∈ Sk, say,
where x>a = λk.
This proves the theorem. We also note that the described sets Sk and S′k are
defined in terms of the game (A,−A + ab>) independently of the parameter λ.
Namely, the condition x>a = a>x = λ implies that the polyhedron P in (2) for
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B = −A + ab> is given by
(39)
P = {(x, v) ∈ X×R | (−A + ab>)>x ≤ 1v }
= {(x, v) ∈ X×R | −A>x + bλ ≤ 1v } ,
so Sk and S′k are projections of certain faces of P.
A suitable algorithm that enumerates all Nash equilibria can be adapted from
the algorithm by Adler and Monteiro (1992, p. 173) that proceeds from breakpoint
to breakpoint using Theorem 10. The corresponding segments of N can then be
checked for nonempty intersections with H, which are then output as maximal
Nash subsets if they meet the conditions of Theorem 19.
We give an outline of this algorithm. Suppose λ is equal to a breakpoint λk.
Then Yk in (32) is the projection of Y(λk) = OptFace(Dλk), and Xk in (31) is the
projection of OptFace(Pλk) by Lemma 13(b) and Lemma 12. If (Xk ×Y) ∩ H is not
empty, its projection to X × Y is a maximal Nash subset Sk × Yk. Start from some
(λ, x) ∈ Xk. If λ = x>a then x ∈ Sk, which is a suitable starting point for the
vertex enumeration of the polytope Sk, for example with the program lrs (Avis,
2018). If λ < x>a or λ > x>a then the condition (Xk × Y) ∩ H 6= ∅ is checked
with one of the LPs in (37) by Lemma 17 which then have optimal value zero,
with optimum (λ∗, x∗, v∗, s∗); then λ∗ = x∗>a, and x∗ ∈ Sk is a new starting point
to enumerate the vertices of Sk.
The next segment to be tested for its intersection with H is X′k × Y′k in (29) and
(30). For that purpose it is not necessary to find some λ′ ∈ (λk,λk+1), because
Y(λ′) = OptFace(SLmax(λk)) by Theorem 10, and the true inequalities M ∪ N
of that face are found by Lemma 14, so that one obtains X′k as the projection of
P(M, N). Moreover, we have x ∈ Xk ⊆ X′k. If λ = x>a then x is also a starting
point for the enumeration of the vertices of S′k, which gives the Nash subset S
′
k ×
Y′k (which is, however, not maximal if S
′
k ⊆ Sk, see Theorem 19). If λ < x>a then
we solve P max(M, N, a,λk) in (37) to find out if H intersects the current segment
X′k × Y′k, and similarly P min(M, N, a,λk) if λ > x>a. Finally, the next breakpoint
λk+1 is found as the solution to BRmax(M, N) in (27) by Lemma 13(a).
For initialization and termination of this algorithm, we use that the possible
values of λ can be restricted to [α, α] with α and α as minimum and maximum of
{a1, . . . , am}. The initialization is λ = α, which is decided to be a breakpoint or
not as described after (21). The constraint λ ≤ α is added to the step of finding
the next breakpoint, which terminates the algorithm when it is found to hold as
equality.
This algorithm, based on Theorem 19, for enumerating all Nash equilibria of a
rank-1 game has the following noteworthy features. First, it works for all games
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(degenerate or not), and its characterization of maximal Nash subsets is simpler
than for general bimatrix games (Avis, Rosenberg, Savani, and von Stengel, 2010),
and could even be adapted to easily represent these Nash subsets in terms of their
inequalities rather than their vertices (which would be of interest if they are high-
dimensional). Secondly, the algorithm in effect traverses N which is generically
a path. Rather than by solving a succession of LPs, it can also be implemented by
a variant of the algorithm by Lemke (1965) with the additional linear constraints
λ ≥ x>a or λ ≤ x>a, depending on the current sign of λ− x>a. Here, traversing
this path gives all Nash equilibria, whereas for general bimatrix games Lemke’s
algorithm (as in von Stengel, van den Elzen, and Talman (2002) or Govindan and
Wilson (2003)) only finds one Nash equilibrium.
6. TWO EXAMPLES
In this section, we illustrate the results of the previous sections with an example
of a rank-1 game. After that we will give an example that shows that binary search
will in general not work for a game of rank 2 or higher, even though Lemma 5
suggests the possibility of finding a Nash equilibrium of such a game via a recur-
sive rank reduction.
Consider the following rank-1 game (A, B),
(40) A =
[
1 0
0 1
]
, B =
[
1 −2
−1 0
]
, A + B =
[
2 −2
−1 1
]
= ab>,
where a> = (2,−1) and b> = (1,−1). This game has the two pure equilibria
((1, 0), (1, 0)) and ((0, 1), (0, 1)), and the mixed equilibrium ((14 ,
3
4), (
1
2 ,
1
2)). By
Theorem 6(b), these are the equilibria (x, y) of the game (A,−A + 1λb>) so that
x>a = λ. For x = (1, 0), (14 ,
3
4), (0, 1), this means λ = 2,−14 ,−1.
The left two diagrams in Figure 3 show the set N in (9) where (x, y) is an equi-
librium of the parameterized game (A,−A + 1λb>), where
(41) −A + 1λb> =
[
−1 0
0 −1
]
+
[
λ −λ
λ −λ
]
.
These equilibria are pure except when λ ∈ [−12 , 12 ], when the unique mixed strat-
egy (1 − x2, x2) of player 1 is given by equalizing the column payoffs, −(1 −
x2) + λ = −x2 − λ, that is, λ = 12 − x2. The white dots indicate the intersection
of N with the hyperplane H in (8), which is defined by the equation λ = x>a =
2(1− x2)− x2 = 2− 3x2, and no constraints on y.
The right two diagrams in Figure 3 show the domains of the LPs Pλ in (17)
and Dλ in (15) for λ = −14 . Again we show x in X as (1− x2, x2) and y in Y as
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FIGURE 3.— Left and center-left: The path N in (9) for the game (41), for x =
(1− x2, x2) ∈ X and y = (1− y2, y2) ∈ Y, and the hyperplane H in (8) . Center-
right and right: The LP Pλ in (17) and the polyhedron D in (16) with the objective
function of the LP Dλ in (15) for λ = −1/4.
(1− y2, y2). The constraints of Pλ are then 1− x2 + v ≥ λ and x2 + v ≥ −λ, which
for λ = −14 are v ≥ −54 + x2 and v ≥ 14 − x2. The constraints Ay + 1t ≤ 0 of Dλ
are
(42) 1− y2 + t ≤ 0 and y2 + t ≤ 0 ,
and the objective function λb>y+ t is λ(1− y2− y2) + t, with gradient ( ∂∂y2 , ∂∂t ) =
(−2λ, 1) = (12 , 1) for λ = −14 . For λ > 12 , the optimum of Dλ is attained at the
vertex (y1, y2, t) = (1, 0,−1) of D, for 12 > λ > −12 at the vertex (12 , 12 ,−12), and
for −12 > λ at the vertex (0, 1,−1). For λ2 = 12 and λ1 = −12 , the optimal face of
Dλ is an edge of D. These are the two breakpoints λ1 and λ2 in Theorem 10.
Figure 3 also demonstrates the characterization of the path N in Theorem 15.
The left diagram shows (from left to right) the three pieces X′2, X′1, X
′
0, each of
which happen to intersect H. In the central diagram, the vertical parts of the
path are Y′2, Y′1, Y
′
0, and the horizontal parts (for the breakpoints) are Y2 and Y1.
This corresponds to the following, more elementary game-theoretic explanation.
Except when λ = −12 or λ = 12 , player 2’s equilibrium strategy y in the game
(A,−A+ 1λb>) is constant in λ, which holds because player 1’s payoff matrix A
does not change with λ and y is chosen so as to make player 1 indifferent between
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the pure strategies in the support of his equilibrium strategy. When λ = −12 or
λ = 12 , the game is degenerate, and player 2’s equilibrium strategies form a line
segment, which allows the change of support of her equilibrium strategy y.
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FIGURE 4.— The path N of equilibria of the games in (44) where the binary
search method fails.
Our second example shows that the binary search algorithm no longer works
for rank-r games with r > 1. Consider the following game (A, B) of rank 2:
(43) A =
[
1 −1
0 0
]
, C =
[
4 0
0 0
]
, B = C + ab> =
[
1 0
2 0
]
,
where a> = (−3, 2) and b> = (1, 0). Here, (A, B) is of rank 2 and (A, C) is of
rank 1. The only equilibrium of (A, B) is the pure equilibrium ((1, 0), (1, 0)). The
parameterized game (A, C + 1λb>) has payoff matrices
(44) A =
[
1 −1
0 0
]
, C + 1λb> =
[
4+ λ 0
λ 0
]
.
It has the following equilibria (x, y) depending on λ, which define the set N in
(7), shown in Figure 4: The pure equilibrium ((1, 0), (1, 0)) for λ ≥ −4; the pure
equilibrium ((0, 1), (0, 1)) for λ ≤ 0; the mixed equilibrium ((−λ4 , 1 + λ4 ), (12 , 12))
for −4 < λ < 0, and two further components ((1, 0), (1− y2, y2)) with y2 ∈ [0, 12 ]
when λ = −4 and ((0, 1), (1− y2, y2)) with y2 ∈ [12 , 1] when λ = 0 where the
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game in (44) is degenerate. These are multiple disjoint equilibrium components
for −4 ≤ λ ≤ 0, which cannot happen for a parameterized zero-sum game. As
a result, λ may change non-monotonically along the path N , which in general
causes a binary search to fail, as we show next.
We describe a suitably adapted binary search method for this example, where
instead of solving parameterized LPs we find equilibria of the parameterized
game (44) of lower rank. The smallest and largest components of a as in line 3
of the BINSEARCH algorithm are λ = −3 and λ = 2. For λ = λ, the only equilib-
rium of the game in (44) is (x, y) = ((1, 0), (1, 0)), but for λ = λ there are multiple
equilibria, where we choose (x, y) = ((0, 1), (0, 1)). Then λ = −3 < x>a = 2 and
x>a = −3 < λ = 2, so we next consider the midpoint λ = (λ+ λ)/2 = −1/2
as in line 5 of BINSEARCH, and compute a new equilibrium of this parameterized
game. Suppose this is again (x, y) = ((0, 1), (0, 1)), so that because λ < x>a the
assignment (λ, x, y)← (λ, x, y) takes place for the binary search to continue. This
is the situation shown in Figure 4. At this point, the method will no longer suc-
ceed in finding a suitable value of λ because the search interval [λ,λ] = [−12 , 2]
no longer contains the only possible value for λ, namely −3. The problem is that
in that interval, the set N consists of two disconnected parts where λ < x>a and
λ > x>a on opposite sides of the hyperplane H, so that N no longer intersects
with H. Hence, even though the values of λ converge, the corresponding equilib-
ria (x, y) on the two sides of H will not converge.
This example shows that because of the non-monotonicity of λ along the path
N , there is no equivalent statement to Lemma 16 that would guarantee that a
binary search will succeed.
7. RANK-1 GAMES WITH EXPONENTIALLY MANY EQUILIBRIA
Kannan and Theobald (2010, Open Problem 9) asked if the number of Nash
equilibria of a nondegenerate rank-1 game is polynomially bounded. This is not
the case, because our next result shows that this number may be exponential.
THEOREM 20 Let p > 2 and let (A, B) be the n× n bimatrix game with entries of A
(45) aij =

2pi+j if j > i
p2i if j = i
0 if j < i
for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, and B = A>. Then A + B is of rank 1, and (A, B) is a nondegenerate
bimatrix game with 2n − 1 many Nash equilibria.
PROOF: By (45), A + B = ab> with the n components of a and b defined by
ai = pi and bj = 2pj for 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, so A + B is of rank 1.
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Let y ∈ Y with support S. Consider a row i and let T = {j ∈ S | j > i}. Because
A is upper triangular, the expected payoff against y in row i is
(46) (Ay)i = aiiyi +∑
j∈T
aijyj .
Suppose i 6∈ S. If T is empty, then (Ay)i = 0 < (Ay)1, otherwise let t = min T
and note that for j ∈ T we have aij = 2pi+j < p1+i+j ≤ pt+j ≤ atj, so (Ay)i <
(Ay)t. Hence, no row i outside S is a best response to y. Similarly, because the
game is symmetric, any column that is a best response to x in X belongs to the
support of x. This shows that the game is nondegenerate. Moreover, if (x, y) is an
equilibrium of (A, B), then x and y have equal supports.
For any nonempty subset S of {1, . . . , n}, we construct a mixed strategy y with
support S so that (y, y) is an equilibrium of (A, B). This implies that the game
has 2n− 1 many equilibria, one for each support set S. The equilibrium condition
holds if (Ay)i = u for i ∈ S with equilibrium payoff u, because then (Ay)i < u
for i 6∈ S as shown above. We start with s = max S, where (Ay)s = assys = u, by
fixing u as some positive constant (e.g., u = 1), which determines ys. Once yi is
known for all i ∈ S (and yi = 0 for i 6∈ S), we scale y and u by multiplication with
1/1>y so that y becomes a mixed strategy. Assume that i ∈ S and T = {j ∈ S | j >
i} 6= ∅ and assume that yk has been found for all k in T so that (Ay)k = u for all
k in T, which is true for T = {s}. Then, as shown above, ∑j∈T aijyj < ∑j∈T atjyj =
(Ay)t = u for t = min T, so yi is determined by (Ay)i = u in (46), and yi > 0. By
induction, this determines yi for all i in S, and after re-scaling gives the desired
equilibrium strategy y.
By Theorem 6, the equilibria (x, y) of a rank-1 game are the intersection of the
path N in (9) with the hyperplane H in (8). The exponential number of Nash
equilibria of the game in Theorem 20 shows that N has exponentially many line
segments. Murty (1980) describes a parameterized LP with such an exponentially
long path of length 2n. The payoffs for the game in Theorem 20 have been inspired
by Murty’s example, but are not systematically constructed from it, which would
be interesting. See von Stengel (2012) for further discussions and related work on
the maximal number of Nash equilibria in bimatrix games, such as von Stengel
(1999).
8. A RANK-PRESERVING STRUCTURE THEOREM
Nash equilibria of games are in general not unique, which has led to a large
literature on equilibrium refinements (van Damme, 1991) that impose additional
conditions on equilibria, such as stability against small changes in the game pa-
rameters, as proposed in the seminal paper by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986)
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(KM). They showed that stability has to apply to equilibrium components, that
is, maximal sets of equilibria that are topologically connected (which for bimatrix
games are unions of intersecting maximal Nash subsets, see Section 5). That is, an
equilibrium component is stable if every perturbed game has an equilibrium near
that component (although possibly in different positions depending on the per-
turbation, which is why any single equilibrium may fail to be stable). KM proved
the existence of stable equilibrium components with the help of a structure theo-
rem (Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986, Theorem 1) which states that the equilibrium
correspondence E over the set Γ of strategic-form games with a given number of
players and numbers of strategies is homeomorphic to Γ itself.
In this section, we present in Theorem 22 a similar structure theorem with a new
homeomorphism for bimatrix games that preserves rank. In analogy to Kohlberg
and Mertens (1986, Appendix B), one consequence of this new structure theorem
is the existence of an equilibrium component in a game (A, B) that is stable with
respect to small perturbations that preserve the sum A+ B of the payoff matrices.
This is not interesting for zero-sum games which always have only one compo-
nent, but it is for games of higher rank and applies, for example, to perturbations
of the matrix A in a rank-1 game given as (A,−A+ ab>). Furthermore, a number
of equilibrium-finding algorithms can be interpreted as following a path on the
equilibrium correspondence E via the KM homeomorphism and suitable projec-
tions (Wilson, 1992; Govindan and Wilson, 2003). As a topic for further research,
it may be interesting to study our new homeomorphism in this context, or, simi-
lar to Jansen and Vermeulen (2001), the computation of equilibrium components
that are stable with respect to small perturbations that preserve the sum A+ B of
the payoff matrices.
We first recall the KM homeomorphism from Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). Let
Γ be the set of m× n bimatrix games (A, B) and E ⊆ Γ× X×Y be its equilibrium
correspondence,
(47) E = {(A, B, x, y) | (A, B) ∈ Γ, (x, y) is a NE of (A, B)}.
To distinguish the dimensions of the all-zero and all-one vectors we write them
as 0, 1 ∈ Rm and 0, 1 ∈ Rn. Let a and b be the vectors of row and column averages
of A and B,
(48) a = A1 1n , b = B
>1 1m .
Then A and B correspond uniquely to pairs (A˜, a) and (B˜, b) with
(49) A = A˜ + a1>, B = B˜ + 1b>, A˜1 = 0, 1>B˜ = 0>,
with a and b as in (48). That is, (A, B) is parameterized by a “base game” (A˜, B˜)
where each row of player 1 and each column of player 2 gets payoff zero when
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the other player randomizes uniformly (as in A˜1 1n = 0, where the factor
1
n does
not matter), and a pair of vectors a in Rm and b> with b in Rn that are added to
the rows of A˜ and columns of B˜, respectively, to obtain the correct payoffs.
The KM homeomorphism φ : Γ → E only changes a and b. It is most easily
described by its inverse φ−1 : E→ Γ defined by φ−1(A, B, x, y) = (C, D),
(50) C = A˜ + (Ay + x)1>, D = B˜ + 1(x>B + y>).
That is, (C, D) has the same “base game” (A˜, B˜) as (A, B) but different parame-
ters (Ay + x) ∈ Rm and (B>x + y) ∈ Rn. The fact that (x, y) is an equilibrium
of (A, B) implies that φ−1 is injective (and therefore φ well-defined), by the fol-
lowing intuition. Because x is a best response to y, each row of the vector Ay of
expected payoffs in the support of x has maximal and equal value u among all
components of Ay, by (3). This condition allows us to re-construct x from the sum
c = Ay+ x, which is used in the definition of C in (50) and which can be obtained
from C. Suppose the components ci of c are heights of m “poles in the water”
of which a certain amount xi is “above the waterline” depending on the “water
level” w, where
(51) xi = max(ci − w, 0) ,
so xi ≥ 0 and if ci < w then xi = 0. For any c ∈ Rm, there is a unique choice of
w ∈ R in (51) so that ∑mi=1 xi = 1 and therefore x ∈ X. By this construction of w
and x, all components pi of the vector p = c− x fulfill (a) w = maxk pk, and (b)
xi > 0 implies pi = w, as when p = Ay and x is a best response to y. In a similar
way, y is a best response to x and the sum x>B + y> used to define D in (50) is
special because it allows us first to obtain a vector d ∈ Rn from D, and second
to obtain the original y ∈ Y and q ∈ Rn so that d = q + y and q> = x>B. The
following lemma states this construction, which we apply afterwards to define
the KM homeomorphism, and will later use again for our new homeomorphism.
LEMMA 21 Given c ∈ Rm and d ∈ Rn, there are unique x ∈ X, y ∈ Y, p ∈ Rm and
q ∈ Rn so that
(52)
c = p + x , d = q + y ,
xi = 0 or pi = u = max1≤k≤m pk (1 ≤ i ≤ m),
yj = 0 or qj = v = max1≤l≤n ql (1 ≤ j ≤ n).
PROOF: For t ∈ R, let t+ = max(t, 0), and
(53)
u = min{w ∈ R | ∑mi=1(ci − w)+ ≤ 1 },
v = min{w ∈ R | ∑nj=1(dj − w)+ ≤ 1 },
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where u (and similarly v) is the unique lowest “water level” w so that the “heights”
of the components ci of c that are “above the waterline” sum up to (at most) one.
Then
(54) xi = (ci − u)+ (1 ≤ i ≤ m), yj = (dj − v)+ (1 ≤ j ≤ n),
and p = c− x and q = d− y fulfill (52), and x, y, p, q are uniquely determined by
the conditions x ∈ X, y ∈ Y, and (52).
The KM homeomorphism φ : (C, D) 7→ (A, B, x, y) is then defined as follows.
(a) Let c = C1 1n , d = D
>1 1m , A˜ = C− c1> and B˜ = D− 1d>.
(b) Apply Lemma 21 to get x, y, p, q so that (52) holds.
(c) Let a = c− x− A˜y and b = d− y− B˜>x, and define A and B by (49).
Then φ is continuous because it is defined by continuous linear mappings and
(53) and (54) for (b). We show that (A, B, x, y) ∈ E. We have Ay = (A˜ + a1>)y =
A˜y + a = A˜y + c− x− A˜y = p, and similarly x>B = x>B˜ + b> = d> − y> = q>.
Then the conditions (52) are equivalent to the best-response conditions (3) and (4),
that is, (x, y) is indeed an equilibrium of (A, B). Moreover, c = p + x = Ay + x
and d = B>x + y, which shows that the (continuous) function (A, B, x, y) 7→
(C, D) in (50) is indeed the inverse of φ (so φ is injective), and also that φ is sur-
jective, because we can start in (50) from any (A, B, x, y) ∈ E.
The KM homeomorphism does not operate within a subset of games of fixed
rank (for example, the zero-sum games). Our new homeomorphism ψ : Γ → E
has this property. Consider a fixed matrix M ∈ Rm×n, the set ΓM bimatrix games
(A, B) with A + B = M, and EM as the equilibrium correspondence E in (47)
restricted to these games,
(55)
ΓM = {(A, B) ∈ Γ | A+ B = M}, EM = {(A, B, x, y) ∈ E | (A, B) ∈ ΓM}.
The following theorem states we can restrict ψ to a homeomorphism ΓM → EM
for any M (for example, the all-zero matrix M).
THEOREM 22 Let M ∈ Rm×n. There is a homeomorphism ψ : ΓM → EM, (C, D) 7→
(A, B, x, y), that is, A + B = M for all (C, D) ∈ ΓM.
PROOF: We will use a new parameterization of any matrix A in Rm×n, which
corresponds uniquely to a quadruple (Aˆ,γ, a, b) with Aˆ ∈ Rm×n, γ ∈ R, a ∈ Rm,
and b ∈ Rn according to
(56) A = Aˆ + 1γ1> + a1> + 1b>
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so that
(57) 1> Aˆ = 0>, Aˆ1 = 0, 1>a = 0, b>1 = 0 .
It is easy to see that Aˆ, γ, a, and b are uniquely given by A, (56), and
(58) γ = 1m1
>A1 1n , a = A1
1
n − 1γ, b> = 1m1>A− γ1> .
The homeomorphism ψ : ΓM → EM, (C, D) 7→ (A, B, x, y) uses this parameteri-
zation of C and only changes the vectors a and b, and maintains the sum M of the
payoff matrices, that is, A + B = C + D = M. Like for the KM homeomorphism,
we first describe its inverse ψ−1, which maps (A, B, x, y) in EM to (C, D) in ΓM.
Let A + B = M and (x, y) be an equilibrium of (A, B). Let A be represented as in
(56) so that (57) holds, and let
(59) C = Aˆ + 1γ1> + c1> + 1d>
with c and d given by
(60) c = ρ(Ay + x), d = σ(B>x + y)
where ρ : Rm → Rm and σ : Rn → Rn are the linear projections on the hyperplane
through the origin with normal vector 1 respectively 1,
(61) ρ(x) = x− 1( 1m1>x), σ(y) = y− 1( 1n1>y)
which achieves 1>ρ(x) = 0 and 1>σ(y) = 0 for any x ∈ Rm and y ∈ Rn, as
required for a parameterization of the payoff matrix C like it is done for A in (57).
With C thus encoded, we let D = M− C.
The homeomorphism ψ : (C, D) 7→ (A, B, x, y) itself is obtained as follows. Let
(C, D) ∈ ΓM. Similar to (56) we represent C by (59) where as in (58)
(62) γ = 1m1
>C1 1n , c = C1
1
n − 1γ , d> = 1m1>C− γ1>,
which implies
(63) 1> Aˆ = 0>, Aˆ1 = 0 , 1>c = 0 , d>1 = 0 .
Given c and d, we determine x ∈ X, y ∈ Y, p ∈ Rm and q ∈ Rn by Lemma 21 so
that (52) holds. Then, let
(64) a = c− ρ(Aˆy + x), b = σ((M− Aˆ)>x + y)− d
so that a and b fulfill (57), define A by (56), and let B = M− A. Like φ before, ψ
is defined by linear maps and the continuous operations in (53) and (54) and is
therefore continuous.
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We show that ψ(C, D) = (A, B, x, y) ∈ EM. Because A + B = M, we only need
to show the equilibrium property. Using (56), 1>y = 1, (64), c = p + x, and the
definition of ρ in (61),
(65)
Ay = Aˆy + 1γ1>y + a1>y + 1b>y
= Aˆy + 1γ+ a + 1b>y
= Aˆy + 1γ+ c− ρ(Aˆy + x) + 1b>y
= Aˆy + 1γ+ p + x− (Aˆy + x) + 1( 1m1>(Aˆy + x)) + 1b>y
= p + 1(γ+ 1m1
>(Aˆy + x) + b>y)
= p + 1α
for some α ∈ R which means that (Ay)i = pi + α for 1 ≤ i ≤ m and therefore
by (52) the best-response condition (3) holds (which is unaffected by a constant
shift), that is, x is a best response to y. Similarly, using 1>x = 1, (64), the definition
of σ in (61), and d = q + y,
(66)
B>x = (M− A)>x
= (M− Aˆ− 1γ1> − a1> − 1b>)>x
= (M− Aˆ)>x− 1γ1>x− 1a>x− b1>x
= (M− Aˆ)>x− 1γ− 1a>x− b
= (M− Aˆ)>x− 1γ− 1a>x− σ((M− Aˆ)>x + y) + d
= −1γ− 1a>x− y + 1 1n1>((M− Aˆ)>x + y) + q + y
= 1β+ q
for some β ∈ Rwhich means that (B>x)j = qj + β for 1 ≤ j ≤ n and therefore by
(52) the best-response condition (4) holds, that is, y is a best response to x. Hence,
(x, y) is indeed an equilibrium of (A, B).
To show that ψ has the inverse described in (59) and (60), note that ρ and σ in
(61) are linear and ρ(1) = 0 and σ(1) = 0. Therefore, for ψ(C, D) = (A, B, x, y)
with C as in (59), we have by (65) and (66) and because 1>c = 0 and 1>d = 0,
(67)
ρ(Ay + x) = ρ(p + 1α+ x) = ρ(p + x) = ρ(c) = c ,
σ(B>x + y) = σ(1β+ q + y) = σ(q + y) = σ(d) = d ,
that is, ψ has indeed the (continuous) inverse described in (60) and ψ is both
injective and surjective. This shows that ψ is indeed a homeomorphsim from ΓM
to EM.
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9. CONCLUSIONS
We conclude with some open questions. Our analysis shows that rank-1 games
are computationally easy to analyze: One Nash equilibrium can be found in poly-
nomial time, and enumerating all equilibria can be performed by following a
path, similar to finding a single Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game (which is in
general a PPAD-hard problem).
As described in Section 5, the path of solutions to the parameterized LP con-
sists in general of polyhedral segments whose intersections with the hyperplane
H define the sets of Nash equilibria of the rank-1 game. This set-up suggests the
application of smoothed analysis as pioneered by Spielman and Teng (2004) for the
“shadow vertex algorithm” for parameterized LPs. It has been subsequently im-
proved and simplified; for recent developments see Dadush and Huiberts (2018).
In smoothed analysis, the LP data are perturbed by some moderate Gaussian
noise which cancels “pathological” cases that lead to exponential worst-case ex-
amples, like the game constructed in Section 7. Applied to our parameterized LP,
it would imply that in expectation there is a polynomial number of segments in
Theorem 15. If this holds, the number of Nash equilibria is similarly polynomially
bounded by Theorem 19 (the Nash subsets are all single equilibria because the
perturbed game is generic and therefore nondegenerate with probability one).4
However, the standard framework of smoothed analysis (as in e.g. Dadush and
Huiberts (2018)) assumes that the LP constraints are of the form Ax ≤ 1, which
is not the case for the LP (14), say, so combining this with our approach requires
a careful study that we leave for future work.
In Section 7 we described rank-1 games with exponentially many equilibria
(also with exponential size differences in the payoffs). This raises the following
question: Can all equilibria of a rank-1 game be computed in running time that is
polynomial in the size of the input and output? Such an algorithm is called “out-
put efficient”, which applies for example to the analysis of parameterized LPs by
Adler and Monteiro (1992) that we have used in Sections 4 and 5. For general bi-
matrix games, an output efficient algorithm that finds all Nash equilibria would
imply P = NP because it is NP-hard to decide if a game has more than one Nash
equilibrium (Gilboa and Zemel, 1989). Our binary search algorithm gives no in-
formation about the existence of a second equilibrium, so it is conceivable that
finding a second Nash equilibrium of a rank-1 game is also NP-hard. The exis-
tence of an output efficient algorithm to find all Nash equilibria of a rank-1 game
4For a general bimatrix game, finding one equilibrium is PPAD-hard even under smoothed
analysis (Chen, Deng, and Teng, 2009). However, the exponentially long paths in Savani and von
Stengel (2006) do not persist when the game is perturbed, due to exponential size differences in
the payoffs.
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is an open question.
Finally, given that the computational analysis of general bimatrix games is diffi-
cult but easy for rank-1 games, economic applications of large rank-1 games should
be further investigated, also as approximate economic models that can serve
as fast-solvable benchmarks. As a possible starting point, we describe a simple
“trade” scenario, which suggests that rank-1 games are much more versatile and
economically interesting than zero-sum games. Consider the following “trade
game”. Let player 1 be a seller of a product who can choose possible quality levels
ai for i = 1, . . . , m, and let player 2 be a buyer who can decide on possible quantity
levels bj for j = 1, . . . , n that she buys from the seller. A price pij that is paid from
buyer to seller can be chosen completely arbitrarily for each i and j. Suppose there
are further parameters α, β, γj, and δi so that the payoff to the players are
(68)
payoff to player 1 : pij − αaibj + γj
payoff to player 2 : −pij + βaibj + δi .
We further assume that β > α > 0, which reflects that high quality is costly to
produce for player 1 and beneficial for player 2, with (β − α) representing the
benefits from trade. The additional parameter γj (increasing with bj) is an addi-
tional benefit to player 1 for higher amounts of sold quantities, and similarly δi
to player 2 for higher quality. Neither γj nor δi affect the players’ best responses
and can therefore assumed to be zero. This gives a strategically equivalent game
whose sums of payoffs are (β− α)aibj and therefore of rank one. Because rank-
1 games can be analyzed very fast, this “trade game” can be studied for large
values of m and n, and in particular for its possibly many price levels. The con-
crete economic interpretation of such games and their equilibria remains to be
investigated.5
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